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The Catch in Trading Fishing Access for Foreign Aid 
 
Abstract 
The Pacific island countries depend heavily on bilateral aid. Much of this aid is provided by distant 
water fishing nations in exchange for cheap access to the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery. 
Japan access fees (approximately US$8 million) are comparable to about 5 percent of Japanese aid to 
the region (approximately US$150 million). If access fees were maximized, there is potential for the 
access fees to match, possibly double, total Japanese aid to the region. It is argued that aid 
dependency is decreasing the transparency of fishing treaties, decreasing the flexibility of government 
spending, exposing the Pacific island countries to large financial risks associated with possible aid 
withdrawal, and stifling the region’s own efforts for fisheries and broader economic development. 
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Introduction 
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean is home to the world’s largest and most valuable tuna fishery. 
The tuna migrate through the exclusive economic zones of 22 states and territories (waters of 
national jurisdiction within 200 miles of a nation’s coastline, as delineated in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea), and beyond into vast expanses of international waters (see Figure 
1). Tuna is the only significant natural resource of many of the Pacific island countries, and so 
governance of the resource is a very important, and often highly politicised, issue. Revenue from the 
fishery constitutes significant proportions of government revenue, export earnings and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the Pacific island countries, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Economic statistics showing the importance of the tuna industry for selected Pacific Island 
countries 
 Government revenue 
(percent) 
Exports 
(percent of total value) 
GDP 
(percent) 
Cook Is. … 41 (1999) … 
Fiji … 7 (1997) 1 (1998) 
FSM 29 (1998) 92 (1997) 16 (1990) 
Kiribati 61 (1998) 53 (1993) 10 (1993) 
Marshall Is. 25 (1993) 94 (1997) … 
New Caledonia … 27 (1996) … 
Palau 5 (1993) - … 
Papua New Guinea 2 (1999) 1 (1999) … 
Samoa … - 6 (1999) 
Solomon Is. ≈ 5 (1993) 20 (1993) 9 (1993) 
Tonga … 18 (1998) … 
Tuvalu ≈ 35 (1993) - 5 (1993) 
Vanuatu - <1 (1993) … 
Notes: … = not available 
 - = negligible or zero 
 ≈ = approximately 
 < = less than 
Source: Petersen (2002b)  
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Figure 1: The Western and Central Pacific region with exclusive economic zones (Source: Secretariat of the Pacific Community) 
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Despite the richness of the tuna resource, the Pacific island countries have found it tremendously 
difficult to capture what would appear to be the appropriate level of economic rent from the fishery 
(Petersen 2002a). A review of fisheries literature in Section 2 indicates that fees paid to access the 
Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery appear to be well below the true resource rents. There are a 
number of possible reasons for this; three are presented in Petersen (2002a). First, the pressing need 
for job creation and foreign exchange has led to the exchange of cheap (or free) access for 
domestically-based activities. Second, while government should invest economic benefits from the 
fishery productively, they are often dissipated through wasteful consumption expenditure and poor 
quality investments. Third, the Pacific island countries depend heavily on bilateral aid provided by 
distant water fishing nations in exchange for cheap access. 
 
Fisheries ministers gain much public support when announcing aid packages (i.e., the funding of 
infrastructure or hospitals) that have been negotiated as part of the access agreements. Moreover, 
much of this aid has been used in direct support of the domestic fishing industry, in almost all cases 
with poor results. In 1986, the United States government signed the “Compact of Free Association” 
with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands (both former US colonies). Under 
the agreement, these countries received US$6 billion in US aid over a 15-year period, most of which 
was received in the first five years of the agreements. Schurman (1998) notes that this aid facilitated 
overly large investments in the tuna industry. Anxious to establish a tuna industry, the Federated 
States of Micronesia used aid money to buy purse seiners from an Australian businessman at three 
times their value, with Yap state buying five purse seine boats before it had time to acquire 
experience in the sector. These are sizeable investments; the market value of a new purse seine boat 
is US$12-15 million, and a used one, US$6-9 million. All these investments have made significant 
financial losses. Tuvalu, Kiribati and Solomon Islands are other Pacific island governments that have 
been investing aid money into purse-seine vessels with poor results. Another example of the poor use 
of foreign aid is the building of a transshipment port in Majuro, Marshall Islands, which was donated 
by Japan but was empty for close to a decade due to the lack of domestic or foreign boats to service 
(Schurman 1998). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that the quantity of foreign aid received in exchange 
for cheap access to the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery is not so large as to warrant the aid 
dependency that has developed. Furthermore, this aid dependency decreases the transparency of 
fishing treaties, decreases flexibility in government spending, exposes the Pacific island countries to 
large financial risks associated with the possibility of aid withdrawal, and is stifling the region’s own 
efforts in fisheries development, and indeed broader economic development. The structure of the 
paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a comparison between access fees and foreign aid received by 
the Pacific island countries. Japan is the focus of the comparison. Currently, Japanese access fees are 
equivalent to about six percent of total Japanese aid to the region. However, if access fees were 
maximized (rather than traded cheaply for foreign aid or domestically-based activity), there is 
potential for access fees to at least equal, possibly double, the total amount of aid received. A brief 
discussion of the role of aid in fisheries development in the Pacific is presented in Section 3. 
  
Comparing foreign aid with tuna fishery access fees 
Of the distant water fishing nations active in the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery, only Japan 
and the United States donate significant amounts of foreign aid to the region (Table 2). Large block 
donations of foreign aid to the region reflect political ties. The United States provides generous 
financial support to the former colonies of Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and 
Palau through the Compact of Free Association. Australia donates large amounts of aid to Papua 
New Guinea, a former Australian territory. France is a generous benefactor to its overseas territories, 
French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna. Japan provides similar amounts of foreign 
aid to the region as the United States, although this aid is spread over a larger number of countries - 
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possibly reflecting the exchange of foreign aid for cheap fisheries access. Japan is the focus of the 
remainder of this section. 
 
Table 2: Foreign aid donated to the Pacific island countries by donor, 1998-99 average, $US million 
 Japan 
United 
States 
 
Australia 
New 
Zealand 
 
France 
Other 
bilateral 
Mulit-
lateral 
Cook Islands 0.3 - 0.9 2.6 0.1 0.1 1.4 
Fiji 18.0 - 10.9 3.5 0.9 2.0 3.4 
French Polynesia - - 0.2 0.2 399.7 2.3 - 
FSM a 8.0 90.0 0.7 0.3 - - 5.3 
Kiribati 10.9 0.6 4.7 2.0 - 0.9 1.5 
Marshall Islands 9.9 46.2 0.5 0.1 - - 7.3 
Nauru 2.3 - 3.4 - - - 0.1 
New Caledonia 0.1 - 0.3 0.3 346.3 1.7 0.1 
Niue 0.1 - 0.6 2.8 - - 0.2 
Palau 28.5 15.4 0.2 0.1 - - 0.1 
PNG b 45.4 4.0 177.0 8.0 - 12.0 10.0 
Samoa 7.0 0.7 7.0 5.0 - 3.1 4.9 
Solomon Islands 9.2 0.8 10.1 5.1 - 25.3c 7.1 
Tokelau - - 0.1 3.9 - - 0.2 
Tonga 6.2 - 5.4 4 0.2 2.8 3.6 
Tuvalu 0.9 - 1.3 1.2 0.3 0.1 1.7 
Vanuatu 5.9 0.7 9.9 4.1 7.7 3.7 10.0 
Wallis and Futuna - - - - 51.1 0.2 - 
Total 152.7 158.4 233.2 43.2 806.3 28.9 56.9 
a Federated States of Micronesia  
b Papua New Guinea 
c European Commission 
Source: OECD DAC database 
 
Japan started donating aid to the Pacific islands region in the early 1970s at a time when world aid 
flows increased significantly (Figure 2). Skepticism about the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
generating economic growth led to the scaling back of world aid flows in the 1990s. However, aid 
flows from Japan to the Pacific island nations remained high in the 1990s, although they experienced 
large fluctuations. Total Japanese aid decreased in the early to mid 1990s, though it rebounded to 
late-1980 levels in the late 1990s (Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: Aid donated by Japan to the Pacific island countries and total worldwide aid flows through 
time (the bold line relates to the right-hand axis and does not include Japanese foreign aid to Fiji, 
Samoa, Tokelau or Tonga) 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
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Figure 3: Total aid donated by Japan through time in 1999 terms 
Source: OECD DAC database 
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There is little consensus in the literature regarding the size of the access fees negotiated by the Pacific 
island countries. Negotiations are made mostly through bilateral treaties with the distant water fishing 
nations, although one multilateral treaty has been negotiated between the United States and the 16 
Pacific island countries. Some studies cite access fees in the order of five percent (Shurman 1998, 
Cartwright 1999, NCDS 1997, Hunt 1997). However, more recent publications cite lower figures. 
Gillett et al.  (2001) indicate that access fees have fallen from an average of four percent in 1982 to 
three percent in 1999. Moreover, the World Bank (1996) indicated substantial differences between 
access fees paid by distant water fishing nations as presented in Table 3. In a later study, van Santen 
and Muller (2000) gave evidence of a decline in access fees paid by Japan but slight rises by other 
major distant water fishing nations.  
 
Table 3: Access fees paid by major distant water fishing nations 
Distant water fishing nation Access fee (percent of gross revenue) 
 World Bank (1996) Van Santen and Muller (2001) 
United States 10 10 
Japan 5.0 1.1 
Chinese Taipei 3.7 3.8 
Republic of Korea 2.2 3.4 
 
 
Bertignac et al. (2000) estimate that the total resource rent of the Western and Central Pacific tuna 
fishery is 13 percent of gross sales at 1996 levels of effort. They also show that if effort level and fleet 
structure of the fishery were at lower levels, the resource rent could be as much as 40 percent of 
gross revenue. In a study of the Papua New Guinean tuna fishery, Gillett et al. (2000) estimate 
resource rents to be between 10 and 31 percent of gross revenue depending on vessel technology.  
 
A comparison between access fees derived from the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery and 
other tuna fisheries is also a useful exercise. Iheduru (1995) notes with exasperation that the 
European Union is paying African countries access fees between 18 and 45 percent of the value of 
the catch. The Australian Fisheries Management Authority charges Australian Bluefin tuna fishers a 
management fee that is based on cost recovery alone of approximately 11 percent of gross revenue. 
These studies provide strong evidence that access fees to the Western and Central tuna fishery are 
well below the true resource rents. At current levels of exploitation, it appears that the true resource 
rents are at least triple what the Pacific island countries are currently receiving. 
 
The gross revenue from Japan’s catch can be calculated by multiplying the quantity of fish harvested 
(Table 4) by the price of the fish (Table 5). Purse seining is Japan’s major method of harvest, which 
targets Skipjack tuna, and to a lesser extent, Yellowfin and Bigeye. Pole and line fishing is also 
frequently used which targets Skipjack tuna. As a result, Skipjack harvests represent three-quarters of 
Japan’s tuna harvest. The proportions of each species in the tuna catch are similar to those taken by 
all distant water fishing nations: Skipjack, 67 percent; Yellowfin, 19 percent; Bigeye, 5 percent; and 
Albacore, 3 percent (SPC 2000).1 Tuna prices differ according to species and harvest technology – 
mainly depending on whether the tuna is sold for sashimi or canning purposes. Bigeye, which 
represents approximately six percent of total catch is the most valuable tuna species; its main market 
being the lucrative Japanese sashimi market. Skipjack, the fastest growing and hence, most prevalent 
species, is used for canning purposes and is the least valuable tuna species. 
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Table 4: Tuna catch by Japan by major species (average 1993-1998, metric tonnes)a 
  Skipjack Yellowfin Bigeye Albacore Total 
Longline  19836 20226 15788 55851 (15) 
Pole and line 113147 3772   116919 (31) 
Purse seine 163190 40722 3456  207368 (55) 
Total 276337 (73) 64330 (17) 23682 (6) 15788 (4) 380137 
a Percentages are shown in brackets 
Source: SPC (2000) 
 
 
Table 5: Tuna prices by major species and harvest technology (average 1993-1998, US$/metric 
tonne) 
  Skipjack Yellowfin Bigeye Albacore 
Longline  3770 6830 2100 
Pole and line 1960 1960   
Purse seine 1174 1579 6830  
Source: van Santen and Muller (2000) 
 
It is important to note that most of the catch data presented in this section are based on vessel 
logsheets.  Access fees paid by distant water fishing nations are calculated on catch rates that are in 
turn based on previous catch.  There is, therefore, a direct incentive for fishers to under-report catch 
rates so as to reduce the cost of access.  Hence, the data presented here are likely to be 
underestimates. 
 
The estimated gross revenue from Japan’s catch is presented in Table 6. Due to uncertainty about 
tuna harvests and prices through time, sensitivity analysis on the expected gross revenue of the catch 
is included. The “standard” calculation measures the gross revenue of Japan’s tuna catch in the 
Western and Central Pacific to be US$807 million. This compares favourably with the estimate of 
van Santen and Muller (2000) of US$789 million. For perspective, this is approximately equal to the 
total GDP of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands and 
Tonga. Access fees of 1, 3 and 5 percent of the standard value are presented. At the lowest end of 
this scale, access fees of US$8.1 million also compare favourably with the estimates of van Santen 
and Muller (2000) of US$8.5 million in 1996/7 and US$9.0 million in 1997/98. If Japan’s access fees 
have decreased from 5 percent to 1 percent as reported by the World Bank (Table 3), this represents 
a sizeable decrease in monetary value of the access fees – approximately US$32 million. Fluctuations 
in tuna yields and prices also have a marked effect on revenue generated from the fishery. Estimates 
presented suggest that gross revenue could be between US$0.6 billion and US$1 billion, and access 
fees could fluctuate between US$6 and US$10 million if Japan is paying access fees of 1 percent of 
gross revenue, or between US$32 and US$48 million if she is paying 5 percent. 
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Table 6: Sensitivity on the expected value of Japan’s tuna catch and access fees 
 
Access fees (US$ millions) 
 
Expected gross revenue 
from catch 
(US$ millions) 
1% of gross 
revenue 
3% of gross 
revenue 
5% of gross 
revenue 
-20% 645.3 6.5 19.4 32.3 
-10% 726.0 7.3 21.8 36.3 
Standard 806.7 8.1 24.2 40.3 
10% 887.4 8.9 26.6 44.4 
20% 968.0 9.7 29.0 48.0 
 
 
Table 7 presents estimates of the value of these access fees captured by each of the Pacific island 
countries. Gillett et al. (2001) report that 60 percent of Japan’s harvest is taken in the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) of the Federated States of Micronesia, 18 percent in the EEZ of the Marshall 
Islands, and much smaller proportions in Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu, Palau, Solomon Islands, Fiji and 
Papua New Guinea (column 2). Note that the proportion of Japan’s catch in each of the Pacific 
island country’s EEZ is similar to that of all distant water fishing nations, except 18 percent of the 
total catch of all distant water fishing nations is taken within Papua New Guinea’s EEZ. In the late 
1980s, Papua New Guinea tried to raise the value of access fees to a minimum of six percent. In 
reaction, Japan ceased fishing in Papua New Guinea’s EEZ, fishing instead in other country’s EEZs 
at lower cost (van Santen and Muller 2000). This reflects the problems Pacific island countries have 
when they negotiate bilaterally with distant water fishing nations, competing with one another in 
providing access. Distant water fishing nations realize this and encourage bilateral treaties. The 
success of the Pacific island countries in attracting higher access fees will depend on their success in 
working collectively in allocating access rights. The will to work collectively (for sustainability or rent-
generating reasons) is increasing with the signing of the MHLC.2 The design of an institutional 
structure that would maximize access fees in the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery is outside 
the scope of this paper. However, this issue has been addressed by Duncan and Temu (1995), 
Petersen (2002b), and Chand et al. (2002) and should be the focus of further analysis and debate. 
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Table 7: Tuna catch and access fees paid by Japan in Pacific island country Exclusive Economic 
Zones (1999) 
Access fees 
($US thousand) 
 
Proportion of 
total catcha 
Proportion of 
expected net 
revenue 
($US thousand) 1% 3% 5% 
Fiji 0.00 188 2 6 9 
FSM 0.60 486845 4868 14605 24342 
Kiribati 0.10 83160 832 2495 4158 
Marshall Islands 0.18 145822 1458 4375 7291 
Nauru 0.07 54728 547 1642 2736 
Palau 0.00 375 4 11 19 
PNG 0.00 163 2 5 8 
Solomon Islands 0.00 33 0 1 2 
Tuvalu 0.04 35371 354 1061 1769 
Total 1.00 806684 8067 24201 40334 
a Source: Gillett et al. (2001) 
 
Assuming Japan pays each country access fees in the order of one percent, the monetary value of 
these fees would be approximately US$0.5 million for the Federated States of Micronesia, US$0.15 
million for the Marshall Islands, and lesser amounts to the other Pacific island countries. 
Proportionately greater amounts are received if access fees are 3 or 5 percent of gross revenue. 
 
A comparison between Japanese foreign aid to the region and fishery access fees is presented in 
Table 8. The exact amount of foreign aid exchanged for fishing access is uncertain as not all aid is 
used directly in support of the fishing industry. For this reason and because the size of the true 
resource rents in unknown, the size of the effective public subsidy paid out for this foreign aid in 
exchange for cheap access is also unknown. Hence, this comparison is made with total aid received. 
While not all of this aid is exchanged for cheap access, it is possible that donating countries may 
withhold a large proportion, if not all, foreign aid if Pacific island countries choose to pursue policies 
of maximizing access fees, in which case this comparison is valid. Japan has clearly stated that their 
foreign aid is not given without conditions; it is dependent on the existent of bilateral treaties 
(Shurman 1998). Access fees have been estimated up to a level of 40 percent of gross revenue, which 
has been described as possible (if effort levels were decreased and fleet structure were optimized) by 
Bertignac et al. (2000) and has been reportedly received from European fishers by African nations 
(Iheduru 1995).  
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Table 8: Aid donated by Japan to Pacific island countries (1998-99 average), and sensitivity on access fees 
 Aid donated Access fees as a percentage of gross revenue ($US million) 
($US million) 1% 5%     10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Cook Islands           0.3
Fiji 18.0          
nesia -          
          
           
           
          
donia 0.1          
 0.1          
           
           
amoa 7.0          
           
 6.2          
kelau -          
           
nuatu 5.9          
           
          
           
           
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
French Poly
 FSM 8.0 4.9 24.3 48.7 73.0 97.4 121.7 146.1 170.4 194.7
Kiribati 10.9 0.8 4.2 8.3 12.5 16.6 20.8 24.9 29.1 33.3
Marshall Islands
 
9.9 1.5 7.3 14.6 21.9 29.2 36.5 43.7 51.0 58.3
Nauru 2.3 0.6 2.7 5.5 8.2 10.9 13.7 16.4 19.2 21.9
New Cale
Niue
Palau 28.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
PNG 45.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
S
Solomon Islands
onga
9.2
T
To
Tuvalu 0.9 0.4 1.8 3.5 5.3 7.1 8.8 10.6 12.4 14.1
Va
Wallis and Futuna
 
-
Total 152.7 8.1 40.3 80.7 121.0 161.3 201.7 242.0 282.3 322.7
Sensitivity –20% 6.5 32.3 64.5 96.8 129.1 161.3 193.6 225.9 258.1
Sensitivity +20% 9.7 48.4 96.8 145.2 193.6 242.0 290.4 338.8 387.2
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Current access fees of between 1 and 5 percent of gross fisheries revenue represent between US$8.1 
and US$40.3 million. This revenue is comparable to between 5 and 26 percent of total Japanese aid 
to the region. Access fees of approximately 19 percent of gross fisheries revenue would 
approximately match total Japanese aid. When accounting for seasonal uncertainty in tuna harvests 
and prices (bottom two rows of Table 8), access fees would need to increase to between 16 and 24 
percent of gross revenue. When considering each Pacific island country individually, access fees of 
5 percent of gross revenue are larger than Japanese aid donations to the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Nauru and Tuvalu. Where access fees are 12 percent of gross revenue, all countries 
with significant levels of Japanese fishing activity would generate more money through access fees 
than through Japan’s aid program. The fisheries literature reviewed earlier indicate that access fees 
in the order of 12 percent of gross revenue are realistic. The literature indicates that access fees up 
to 40 percent of gross revenue are possible, which represents more than double total Japanese aid 
to the region. Note that access fees presented in Table 8 are likely to be underestimated due to the 
incentive for underreporting catch. 
 
For countries with minor levels of Japanese fishing activity (Fiji, Palau and Papua New Guinea), it is 
not likely that access fees will ever match current aid donations. These countries, and countries with 
no Japanese fishing activity (Cook Islands, Nuie, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu), could 
stand to lose considerable amounts of aid if they were to cooperate in governing the fishery. 
However, this must be balanced against the knowledge that access fees from other distant water 
fishing nations who are not aid donors (i.e., South Korea and Chinese Taipei) will increase, 
providing large benefits for countries with significant tuna fisheries: Papua New Guinea, the Cook 
Islands and the Solomon Islands. Countries that lose Japanese aid due to cooperation in fisheries 
management with no counteractive benefits from access fees must be compensated by benefiting 
countries if they are to have incentive to cooperate. While outside the scope of the paper, this is a 
very important issue for further research. Lastly, also note that donor countries may not withdraw 
all aid from the region as their motivation behind aid donations are not centred on gaining cheap 
fishing access alone. 
 
Aid and fisheries development in the Pacific 
The earliest economic model of the role of foreign aid in development is the Harrod-Domar model 
where foreign aid, as one form of foreign savings, transferred to less well-off countries augments 
domestic savings to increase investment and accelerate growth (Perkins et al. 2001). This model 
argues that the volume and the cost of capital are critical for economic development. However, no 
strong correlation has been found across countries between aid receipts and economic growth, 
suggesting that either aid is not always used effectively, or that there are limitations in the model. 
 
A view of foreign aid’s macroeconomic impact that has gained prominence since the mid 1980s is 
the booming sector or Dutch Disease effect. Proponents of this view assert that large aid flows 
cause certain sectors to boom with adverse consequences for international competitiveness of other 
sectors and the economic structure as a whole. The non-booming tradeable sectors find their 
performance hindered by the growth of the booming sector as resources are drawn away by the 
booming sectors bidding up their price (e.g. van Wijnbergen 1986; Weisman 1990; White 1992; and 
Younger 1992). 
 
More recently, studies have argued that good governance, not capital, is most critical to 
development. Good governance relates to the need for strong and effective economic institutions 
(such as secure property rights and impartial enforcement of contracts) and good policies (such as 
macroeconomic balance, free trade, flexibility in labour markets, and the concentration of 
government on regulation to ensure competition rather than becoming involved in the production 
of goods and services). The World Bank recently found that foreign aid is effective in supporting 
investment, growth and poverty reduction in countries with good economic policies and 
institutions, but has little effect in countries with a poor economic and institutional environment 
(Burnside and Dollar 1997; Dollar and Easterly 1998; and Collier and Dollar 1998). 
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 2 
What appears to matter most for the effective use of aid is not its form or the terms on which it is 
donated, but the extent to which aid is successfully integrated by the recipient country into its 
development (Meier 1989). There is little evidence that foreign aid has encouraged development in 
the Western and Central Pacific. The region receives large amounts of aid in per capita terms 
compared with other developing areas (Laplagne et al. 2001). Despite this, the Pacific island 
economies have achieved highly variable, and often unsatisfactory, growth. For example, the 
Marshall Island, Federated States of Micronesia and the Solomon Islands all averaged negative 
GDP growth rates in the late 1990s despite large aid per capita inflows (OECD 2002). Some studies 
argue that aid donations to the Pacific island countries are having Dutch Disease effects, where the 
booming sector is the public sector which, because of the abundance of aid money, has taken over 
many private sector activities in addition to expanding its traditional activities (see Bertram 1999; 
Hooper 1993; and Laplagne 1997). 
 
There is compelling evidence that foreign aid has had a detrimental impact on the fisheries industry 
through diminishing the transparency of fishing right allocations, placing Pacific island 
governments in weaker bargaining positions, and reducing the flexibility of government spending. 
Effectively, foreign aid is disempowering the Pacific island countries own efforts towards 
development. 
 
Fishery managers in the Pacific island countries exchange cheap fisheries access for foreign aid and 
domestically-based industry. Because it is difficult to measure the cost of fishing effort, it is difficult 
to estimate the true resource rent of the fishery, and therefore the size of the public subsidy paid 
out in the form of exchanging cheap access for foreign aid and domestically-based industry. The 
comparison undertaken in the previous section suggests that this subsidy could be extremely large. 
Currently, Japan is paying access fees to the region that are approximately equal to six percent of 
their foreign aid donations. However, if access fees were maximized, it is likely that they could at 
least equal, and possibly double, the quantity of aid given by Japan. Moreover, if access fees were 
maximized, revenue from all distant water fishing nations, not just Japan, would increase. If the 
Pacific island countries pursued policies of maximizing access fees, the lack of capital would not be 
a constraint to development. 
 
The distant water fishing nations encourage the lack of transparency through bilateral treaties, in 
which the Pacific island countries have little negotiating power, and through side payments to agree 
to reduce access fees. This negotiating power is further weakened by the terms and conditions on 
which aid is offered, and the risk of aid withdrawal. If the Pacific island countries relied on access 
fees, rather than foreign aid, they would not be vulnerable to the risk of aid withdrawal. However, 
they could face the risk of boycotts of the fishery by distant water fishing nations, or restrictions on 
imports of tuna products. Yet competition for access to the fishery is increasing with the European 
Union and other distant water fishing nations seeking entry to the fishery, as over-capacity in other 
regions increase. Moreover, it is likely that boycotting nations would re-enter the fishery in time. 
 
While short-term efforts to maximize access fees may cause short-term financial losses, the 
potential for development of the industry is large and is likely to lead to significant and sustained 
economic rewards. Furthermore, decreased aid dependency will strengthen the Pacific island’s 
bargaining position, further increasing the opportunity for increasing access fees. Strong political 
will is required for such a change in fisheries policy to occur. Planning for a decline in aid funds 
now will ease the pain of the restructuring process associated with aid withdrawal. 
 
Another cost of exchanging cheap fisheries access for foreign aid is a diminution in flexibility of 
government spending. The aid substitutes for the Pacific island countries own efforts towards 
development and provides opportunities for diverting funds to other, possibly consumptive, 
purposes. Much of the aid given in exchange for cheap access, whether it has been tied to specific 
projects or not, has been invested in direct encouragement of the tuna industry. By doing this, the 
Pacific island governments have been favouring this industry in contravention of the theory of 
comparative advantage. Unfortunately, all public investments of this kind that have been operating 
for more than two years have failed, some repeatedly. If the Pacific island countries have 
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comparative advantage in some part of the tuna industry then, coupled with a strong institutional 
and policy environment, the private sector will finance them through international capital markets. 
 
In the past, the policy and institutional environments of the Pacific island countries have been 
characterized by heavy protection against imports, inflexible labour markets, large public sectors 
and poorly developed institutional arrangements offering little support of private sector activities 
(Duncan et al. 1999). However, this picture is changing with greater experience and understanding 
of the benefits of ‘market-friendly’ institutions and policies. With these improvements in the 
investment environments of the Pacific island countries, development will occur. Development 
financed through fisheries revenue will be stronger than aid-funded development, and will avoid 
much of the political constraints associated with foreign aid. The fishing industry will only reach its 
growth potential with a program of liberalisation, self-help and governments, both domestic and 
foreign, playing appropriate roles. Fisheries development will take time and cannot be forced.  
 
Conclusion 
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean is home to the world’s largest and most valuable tuna 
fishery. However, the Pacific island countries have found it tremendously difficult to capture 
significant economic benefits from the fishery. Eighty-six percent of the total tuna harvest is taken 
by distant water fishing nations who pay access fees in the order of approximately 3 percent of 
gross fisheries revenue. Research suggests that the appropriate level of fees is between 10 and 40 
percent of gross revenue, comparable to access fees extracted from other tuna fisheries. 
 
The Pacific island countries are heavily dependent on foreign aid, essentially exchanging aid for 
cheap access to their fisheries and poorly-directed foreign direct investment. Much of this aid has 
been invested in the domestic fishing industry. All of these investments have been financial failures, 
some repeatedly. A comparison of Japan’s foreign aid and access fees indicates that current access 
fees (approximately US$8 million) are comparable to about 5 percent of Japanese aid 
(approximately US$150 million). However, if access fees were set at what seems to be more 
appropriate levels through cooperative multilateral governance, they could equal, and possibly 
double, Japanese aid. Greater benefits may also be realised with increased access fees from other 
distant water fishing nations, and the elimination of incentives for underreporting catch. It is argued 
that the present level of aid dependency would not be necessary if access fees were maximized; and 
capital would not be a constraint to development. Aid dependency is decreasing the transparency of 
fishing treaties, decreasing flexibility in government spending, exposing the Pacific island countries 
to large financial risks associated with the possibility of aid withdrawal, and stifling the region’s own 
efforts in fisheries development and broader economic development. Given the needed 
improvements in the institutional and policy environments of most of the Pacific island countries, 
development will occur. Development financed by fisheries revenue will be stronger than aid-
financed development, and will avoid many of the current political constraints associated with 
foreign aid flows. 
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Footnotes 
1 The remaining 6 percent of catch represents other tuna species. 
2 The need for cooperation in managing highly migratory fish stocks, as outlined in the UN Fish 
Agreement, led to the September 2000 signing of the Multilateral High Level Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean (MHLC 2000).  All coastal and distant water fishing nations (except Japan) signed the 
Convention, which requires the establishment of a Commission that will be responsible for 
promoting cooperation and coordination between members to ensure the conservation of fish 
stocks.  The Commission does not have an organisational structure as yet and, due to the time 
needed for ratification, it is not expected to come into force until at least 2003. 
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